Authors: Cindy Holder, in Mihaela Mihai and Mathias Thaler (eds.)

Year: 2014

Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 203-219

Are there wrongs for which states cannot apologise? In this chapter,
I argue that the answer is ‘Yes’. I begin with the simple observation that
reasoning as a state official requires a conception of what officials do,
and so a conception of what is – and is not – properly undertaken on
behalf of the state. To act as an official, then, requires a theory of what
happens in a well functioning state: it requires a normative theory of
the state. Whether state officials can recognise their own actions or the
actions of past state officials as wrongs for which apology is required will
depend on their theory of the ends and interests that state actors may,
and must, have. What officials believe to be necessary for a state to be a
good example of its kind will affect what they recognise as outside the
bounds of what a state official ought to do.

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